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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
from which it may be inferred that he intends to recognize him
still as such tenant, he becomes thereby tenant from year to year,
upon the conditions of the original lease. Where moreover, the
lessor does not act recognizing the continuing tenacy, the tennant
holding over is but a tenant at sufferance.'
It is submitted that the chattel mortgagee should have priority over a lease subsequently created by holding over, unless the
landlord can show that the mortgagee lent the money in contemplation not only of the then existing lease but also of a probable holdover tenancy.8
-MORRIS

S. FUNT.

M=us AND {INERALS - CONVEYANCING OF COAL B1Y SALE Ol
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue sought to collect
taxes on annual minimum royalty payments made by the taxpayer
under a certain coal lease. The lease was simply whether the payments made by the taxpayer, the "lessee", were on capital account
or were ordinary business expenses. Both parties petitioned the
Circuit Court of Appeals to review the orders of the Board of Tax
Appeals. 24 B. T. A. 554. The lease here considered was for a term
of forty years, and provided for royalties at a certain rate per ton.
Royalty was to be paid on a minimum tonnage of 250,000 tons
per year, whether or not that amount were mined. It was to continue in force until all coal had been removed, if the initial term
of forty years expired before the depletion of the mine. If the
minimum production were not mined for any year, the difference
between that and the quantity mined would be applied in any
subsequent year, when actual production exceeded the minimum
tonnage required. During two years of the lease, the taxpayer
LEASE. -

7Emerick v. Tavenner, 9 Gratt. (Va.) 220 (1852).
8
The citation in the principal case purporting to come from Allen v.
Bartlett, 20 W. Va. 46 (1882) is in reality taken from Emerick v. Tavenner,
supra n. 5 at 236. The writer believes that there are two leases involved in
every hold-over tenancy. In the first place, there has been a preceding term
for years, - a definite type of estate in land at common law. Secondly,
upon the termination of the original, there arises either a tenancy by the
sufferance, or one from year to year. Either of these two latter types is a
different estate in real property from the lease for years. Thus, there are in
fact, two separate and distinct leases. It is simply as if two successive
terms for years had been given; each would be a distinct common law estate. A running lease, from year to year, (or any other period), on the other
hand, would be one continuous tenancy throughout its duration, and not a
series of terms, one following on the heels of its predecessor.
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failed to mine the minimum tonnage, but paid royalties on the
basis of 250,000 as required. In its income tax return for the two
years, the taxpayer deducted the amount of the royalties as an
ordinary and necessary expense of the business. The Commissioner disallowed the part of the royalties representing unmined coal,
which he regarded as capital expenditure in advance. The Board
of Tax Appeals determined that the payments were necessary
operating expenses. On review being sought, the Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue 'v. Jamison Coal and Coke
Company.'
Whether or not these payments are necessary operating expenses or capital investments depends on whether the instrument
of conveyance established a sale or a lease of the coal.'
If the
instrument created a sale of the coal, then the taxpayer should pay
as on a capital investment.' On the other hand, the payment was
a necessary operating expense, if the instrument were a lease.'
There is a great diversity of opinion as to what constitutes a coal
lease or sale. It has been held that there is a sale where the vendee has (a) the exclusive right to mine (b) all the coal land (c)
where the vendee must pay for all the coal whether mined or inmined.' This test was adopted in at least one case in West Virginia.' But the authority of this case is disregarded in a later
case of substantially similar facts' and explained away in another.!
Where the instrument stipulates a certain total payment, without
regard to the quantity of coal mined, nor to the expiration of the
term, it is generally construed as a sale.' The lessee is obliged to
167

F. (2d) 342 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1933).
2Jefferson Gas Coal Co. v. Com'r of Internal Revenue, 52 F. (2d) 120 (C.
C. A. 3rd, 1931).
'W. S. Bogle & Co. v. Com 'r of Internal Revenue, 26 F. (2d) 771 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1928).
'Burnet v. Hutchinson Coal Co., 64 F. (2d) 275 (C. C. A. 4th, 1933).
Delaware L. & W. R. Co. v. Sanderson, 109 Pa. 583, 585, 1 Ati. 394 (1885);
Robinson v. Pierce, 278 Pa. 372, 123 Ati. 324 (1924); Sturdevant v. Thomson,
280 Pa. 233, 124 AtI. 434 (1924).
"National Coal Co. v. Overholt, 81 W. Va. 427, 94 S. E. 738 (1917).
7Minor v. Pursglove Coal Mining Co., 111 W. Va. 28, 161 S. E. 738 (1917).
In this case, under a similar instrument, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held that such instrument was a lease because the parties termed it
such and dealt with each other as lessee and lessor. Seemingly, this reasoning is not sound.
"Bankers' Pocahontas Coal Co. v. Central P. Coal Co., 166 S. E. 491 (W. Va.

1932).

'Jefferson Gag Coal Co. v. Com 'r of Internal Revenue, szpra n. 2; Rosenberger v. McCaughn, Collector, 25 F. (2d) 699 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1928); Delaware
L. & W. R. Co. v. Sanderson, supra n. 5.
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pay an ascertainable sum for all the coal in the tract. There is
no surrender clause in the instrument, hence whether or not the
0
taxpayer mines all of the coal, he will incur liability."
The "lessee" here was privileged to mine all of the coal, but
by the contract had to pay for what was not mined. Accordingly,
all of the elements of a sale were present. The decision in the
principal case may, therefore, be doubtful.
-JOHN L.DRETCH.

TAxATION -

FUTURE INTERESTS -

PRESUMPTION OF CAPACITY

BEARI CHILDREN. - The trustee of the testator's estate, the income from which was given to his daughter for life, with remainder to certain charitable institutions, if she should die without issue, brought suit for refund of an alleged overpayment of
taxes. Under the statute' the amount given to charities was to be
deducted from the gross estate in computing the federal estate tax.
Evidence was offered that prior to the testator's death, the
daughter had undergone an operation rendering her incapable of
issue. Held: The evidence was admissible to show the vesting of
the remainder in the charity. United States v. Provident Trust
Company.'
In applying the presumption that possibility of issue is not
extinguished until death, the English courts claim to distinguish
between those cases in which property rights will be affected and
those in which they will not.' In the former class the presumption
is treated as being conclusive,' while in the latter it is considered
To

10It is the established rule in tax collection cases, which are brought at the
instance of the Government, that all doubts are resolved against the Government. Gould v. Gould, 245 U. S. 151, 38 S. Ct. 53 (1917). Possibly this
rule of law was an unmentioned factor in the decision of the principal case.

'Revenue Act of 1918, § 403 (a) (3), 40 STAT. 1098. Since present value
of contingent bequest to charity is not deductible from gross estate, Humes
v. U. S., 276 U. S. 487, 48 S. Ct. 347 (1928), it is important that the possibility of issue be extinct and the remainder to charity be vested at death of
testator. The deduction is determined from the data available at that time.
'

-

U. S. -

, 54 S. Ct. 389 (1934).

a" If property is given to A in the event of B having no children, can A
claim that property before the death of B? My answer is, 'No'; neither at
law, nor in equity, unless B's possible child is the only person who can deprive A of the property."
Be Hocking, 79 L. T. N. S. 164, 169 (1898),the limitation here was: to unborn son of A in fee, but if no issue of A,
then to B in fee.
IIn applying the rule against perpetuities, to suppose it impossible for
persons of advanced years to have children "is a very dangerous experiment,
and introductive of the greatest inconvenience, to give latitude to such sort
of conjecture."
Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox 324 (1787); Leake v. Robinson, 2
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